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One of the many puzzling features of Kant’s Opus Postumum – the unpublished 
papers and fragments he was working on up to his death – is his frequent invocation 
of Spinoza. These references, found mostly in the very late sections of the text, are 
particularly striking given the content of its earlier sections.1 In ‘Übergang 1-14’ 
(labelled ‘The Ether Proofs’ in the English translation), written in 1799, Kant argues 
for a single dynamical continuum, the ether (also called caloric), that is the material of 
all appearances. Ether is posited a priori as the single object of perception whose 
moving forces provide the material for all bodies, and enable the subject to perceive 
things in space and time. This ‘universally distributed, all-penetrating world-material’ 
originally fills space and time with forces, making experience possible in general.2 
Ether is therefore the material condition of experience, or ‘hypostatized’ space. The 
unity of experience demands that this single, space-filling continuum of forces be 
posited a priori to exist, not hypothetically, but actually.  
 
Kant had long held a dynamical theory of matter and had argued that matter, 
understood under the principles of natural science set out in the first Critique, is 
reducible to the interaction of fundamental forces.3 The concept of ether is, however, 
a significant development of that view. It is envisioned as the original, primary matter, 
which need not appeal to any ground outside itself for its being or subsistence. It 
contains the material for all possible experience, but is not an ideal sum-total of all 
possibilities. It is the unified origin of appearance in general, but does not transcend 
appearances as a supersensible cause. Ether explains the possibility of affection 
without recourse to noumena or rational ideas, perhaps providing a preliminary 
response to one of the cliffhangers of the first Critique: ‘the manifold, to be intuited, 
must be given prior to the synthesis of understanding, and independently of it. How 
this takes place, remains here undetermined.’4  
 
There is considerable debate about what Kant’s ether is and what it entails for 
transcendental idealism, but entering into that debate is not the purpose of this paper.5 
Here, I focus on the following questions. Given his apparent argument in the Opus 
Postumum for the unity of matter and experience in a unique, original, and self-active 
substance, how are we to interpret Kant’s references to Spinoza? Is he admitting an 
affinity between his own concept of the ether and Spinoza’s concept of substance – 
mediated, perhaps, by the idea of a single nature animated by a world-soul that had so 
recently emerged from Naturphilosophie? 
 
I will argue that Kant’s references to Spinoza in the Opus Postumum are, in fact, 
references to the Spinozism of Johann Gottfried Herder. Throughout the 1780s, 
Herder had developed a teleological Spinozism which posits a universe generated 
from a single organic force with divine attributes of a purposive will. In naming 
Spinoza, Kant signals that his repudiation of Herder’s Spinozism, which had been 
elaborated in the Critique of Judgment, is relevant to the subject-matter of the Opus 
Postumum. While Kant allows Herder, and Naturphilosophie, that the material world 
and spatio-temporal experience are made possible by forces, he is not prepared to 
concede that organisms, human freedom, or God are reducible to force. To maintain 
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the integrity of transcendental idealism, Kant must argue for ‘an immaterial principle’ 
which is demonstrably external to the world of forces, which gives purposive unity to 
nature and moral purposes to human beings.6 It is precisely because Kant comes so 
close to Herder’s Spinozism in this late text that he must so strongly reject it. 
 
I will first set out Herder’s teleological Spinozism, briefly showing how Herder 
makes use of a universal concept of organic force to explain nature, God, and 
humanity as aspects of a single material universe. I will then look at Kant’s critique of 
Herder’s Spinozism in the Critique of Judgment, suggesting that Kant’s major 
objection is to the notion that force could cause purposive effects immanently and 
non-intentionally. I will finish by returning to the Opus Postumum, to argue that 
Kant’s critique of Herder’s Spinozism provides the context for his remarks on 
Spinoza there. 
 
1. Herder’s teleological Spinozism 
 
Kant’s critique of Herder emerges from the pantheism controversy, the rapid 
exchange of texts in the mid-1780s sparked by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s remarks on 
Lessing’s supposed Spinozism. The debate was not really about Spinoza, but about 
whether naturalistic science made faith impossible. Jacobi argued that it did, and 
therefore that an intuitive faith had to be rescued from philosophers who, if they 
propounded any kind of naturalism, ended up in Spinozistic atheism. Others, like 
Mendelssohn and Herder, argued that, on the contrary, naturalism and even Spinozism 
were compatible with faith. One result of the controversy was that it finally became 
acceptable to publish on Spinoza in Germany, and that a number of interpretations of 
Spinoza entered into circulation. By far the most influential was Jacobi’s own 
Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza, the book that had started the controversy in the 
first place. Jacobi’s interpretation of Spinoza was the major – perhaps only – source 
of Kant’s understanding of Spinoza. Regrettably, Kant probably never read Spinoza’s 
texts.7 
 
His student Herder, however, did, and did so enthusiastically. From his earliest 
writings, he had been developing a Spinozistic vitalism to which Kant was 
increasingly antagonistic. One of Kant’s most devoted and best-liked students in the 
1760s, Herder’s fusion of theism and naturalism, and his assertion of the unity of 
nature and reason through a fundamental organic force, were increasingly distasteful 
to Kant. In texts of the 1770s, Herder offered a naturalistic account of the origin of 
reason, bound up with a monistic conception of a single universe encompassing both 
physical and mental phenomena. The divine and supersensible were part of this 
universe, God being equivalent to the immanent vital force powering change and 
generation. For Herder, as for Spinoza, God is Nature, and man is part of nature.   
 
These ideas were applied on a universal scale in Herder’s 1784-7 Ideas for a 
Philosophy of the History of Mankind.8 In Ideas Herder blends anthropology, history, 
and natural science to put forward a view of the universe as an organic whole 
organized by forces. Organic forces are responsible for the generation of all natural 
phenomena, including human minds and spiritual potential, through the organization 
of matter by organic form. The primary characteristic of human organic form is not 
reason, but erect posture, the physiological condition for higher brain functions. Our 
physical organization determines all that is specifically human: reason, freedom, 
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culture, and our directedness towards our highest potentiality or ‘Humanität’. 
Humanität includes peaceful society, organized religion, and the understanding of 
divine providence, the achievement of which represents both humanity and the 
universe at their most highly organized. Through the purposeful organization of each 
living being, the universe is organized to progress towards the perfection of its 
organic form as a whole, through the realization of Humanität.  
 
Organic form distinguishes an individual as a member of a species, determines its 
physical organization, and directs it towards the ultimate goal of the universe in its 
own species-specific way. But since organic form determines matter as a member of a 
species in general, it must leave very much undetermined at the individual level. 
What, then, accounts for the infinite variety in nature and generates particular 
differences between individuals? Herder hints at the worry to which Kant will give 
full expression in the Critique of Judgment: nature might be so diverse that it exceeds 
our capacity to understand, and foils our systems of classification. Herder’s solution 
to this problem is to equate organic force with the divine mind, and to yoke both to a 
Spinozistic principle of unity. Since the divine mind ‘has everywhere combined the 
greatest possible multiplicity with unity’, we need not be concerned that individual 
differences will disrupt our understanding.9 Divine organic force gives nature its unity 
and order, which are revealed to us through our experience of natural forces. 
Empirical science is a sure route to understanding nature and God truly, and we need 
not worry that individual differences may exceed our grasp. Indeed, individual 
differences are part of the divine mind’s teleological strategy. Through a process of 
reciprocal determination between organic form and specific instantiation, individual 
differences cause organic forms to progress towards nature’s universal goal. Particular 
things find their complete determination in the process of their development, the 
always-unfinished march towards perfection. The teleological end-point is the 
perfectly organized universe in which every individual is completely determined and 
‘finished’, its place in the perfect organism assured.  
 
Although Ideas has Spinozistic overtones, Herder’s Spinozism was only made explicit 
in his 1787 book God: Some Conversations.10 Taking as its starting point the debate 
that characterized the pantheism controversy, Herder’s God argues that Spinozism 
brings Christianity and naturalism together in one system. The key to their 
reconciliation lies in the concept of organic force, which, Herder says, is how Spinoza 
ought to have understood ‘God or Nature’. Here we need to note a peculiar point 
about Herder’s interpretation of Spinoza. Herder rightly understands Spinoza’s God to 
be an active power rather than a static being. But he argues that Spinoza’s failure to 
grasp the dynamic nature of matter led him to explain physical beings through inert 
extension, to distinguish matter from minds, and to insist on the absolute distinction 
of the attributes from one another.11 Herder takes these to be major problems, because 
they disrupt his vision of a single universe organized exclusively by organic force. He 
thinks that Spinoza ought to have rejected the notion of ‘infinite attributes’ altogether, 
and conceived God as producing all of reality through one single attribute of ‘force’. 
The irony is that Spinoza conceives every attribute as dynamic: the attribute of 
extension is not conceived as inert matter, but as infinite relations of motion and rest. 
Herder’s rush to impose his own vitalism onto Spinoza’s universe blinds him to the 
dynamism that is already intrinsic to it.12 Nonetheless, Herder’s God is an important 
turning point in the history of Spinoza interpretation. The only prior text to take 
Spinoza seriously (and which was widely read) was Jacobi’s afrorementioned 
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Doctrine of Spinoza. Prior to that, Spinoza’s texts had been discussed, by people who 
had mostly never read them, for the sole purpose of denouncing them as atheistic, 
materialistic, and absurd. Jacobi brought Spinoza into the intellectual mainstream, but 
his interpretation is selective, limited, and biased. Herder is the first to acknowledge 
that the anti-Spinozism of the previous hundred years had been historically 
determined and that much of value could be found in the texts themselves.  
 
Importantly, Herder initiates the tradition of understanding Spinoza’s substance as 
dynamic being, the tradition that continues to dominate European interpretations of 
Spinoza today. He sees that the self-causing, necessarily existing substance of 
Spinoza’s Ethics is not a static thing, but the power of a being which immanently 
causes its modes in the same sense in which it causes itself. Particular things are ‘in’ 
God in that they are ontologically dependent on God, not as the products of God’s 
creation, but as inherent effects of God’s immanent causality. The universe is the 
ongoing active causation of effects that remain part of their cause. Combining this 
interpretation of Spinoza with his own doctrine of organic force, Herder substitutes 
for Spinoza’s ‘God’ the term ‘Divine Power’.13 He stresses that Spinoza’s equation of 
God with Nature does not imply atheism, since if Divine Power is active in all things, 
we cannot fail to know it. 
 
We do not know what power is, or how power works. Still less do 
we know how the Divine Power has produced anything, and how it 
imparts itself to everything according to its nature. However, that all 
things must depend upon one self-dependent nature, in their 
existence, their relationships, as well as in every expression of their 
powers, no consistent mind can doubt.14 
 
Herder disapproves of Spinoza’s claim that God consists of an infinite number of 
attributes, of which only two, thinking and extension, are possible objects of human 
knowledge. Had Spinoza been writing after the discovery that matter is made up of 
forces, Herder decides, he would not have needed to posit infinite unknowable 
attributes, or insist on their absolute distinction. Spinoza would have understood that 
Divine Power expresses itself not in infinite unknowable ways, but rather through 
infinite forces, all of which are discoverable through the sciences. With hindsight, he 
suggests, we should reject the mysterious metaphysical aspects of Spinoza’s universe, 
and interpret it as an infinite material dynamism generated by Divine Power. That 
enables us to combine a thoroughgoing naturalism with a kind of theism, while 
staying true to the Kantian requirement that we remain within the realm of objects of 
possible knowledge. Herder therefore transforms Spinoza’s dictum that God is infinite 
attributes expressed in infinite ways into the doctrine of dynamic pantheism: ‘the 
Deity reveals Himself in an infinite number of forces in an infinite number of ways.’15  
 
Because God is knowable nature, Herder argues, we can discover much more about 
the universe, and God, than Spinoza supposed. Empirical natural science is a method 
for gaining understanding of all possible universes, because all consist of material 
forces that can be known, and that make Divine Power known to us. 
 
In all universes [God] reveals Himself through forces. Furthermore 
this infinity of forces in God which expresses His essence, has no 
limits whatever, although it reveals the same God everywhere. Thus, 
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we must not enviously inquire of any other universe how the Deity 
has revealed Himself in it. Everywhere it is the same as here. 
Everywhere organic forces alone can be active, and every one of 
them makes attributes of an infinite God known to us.16 
 
God expresses itself as Divine Power through the existence and changes of the 
universe, all of which are in God. Herder argues that belief in this God is not 
inconsistent with Christian beliefs and morals. After all, St. Paul meant something 
similar when he said ‘In Him we live and move and have our being’, as Spinoza 
himself noted.17 As the self-sufficient original force generating all things, God is not 
an ‘abstract, lifeless deduction from the world’ but a living being with infinite powers 
of thought and action.  
 
Herder argues that Spinoza must therefore have accepted that God was not only 
supremely active but also supremely wise, and therefore that God’s power was not 
that of blind necessity but of purposive design. Spinoza explicitly denies that God 
operates according to purposes.18 But Herder argues that Spinoza reached the wrong 
conclusion about God due to his mistaken distinction of thought from extension. Had 
Spinoza rejected the idea of infinite distinct attributes and accepted that minds and 
matter are products of a single attribute of force, he would not have needed to 
distinguish God’s thought from his productive activity, or to deny that God’s thought 
could direct material production. Understood as Divine Power, God’s wisdom and 
productivity are seen to be one and the same, and the universe is seen to progress 
according to ‘intelligent necessity’.19 That God does not make choices does not 
preclude his purposive action: the necessity of God’s activity reveals the perfection 
and absolute wisdom of what he creates. So, while Spinoza may deny final causes on 
the level of individuals and species, Herder claims, he affirms that the whole universe 
is intelligently designed towards its own perfection. Acting of necessity and acting for 
the sake of an end are compatible, and so, therefore, are scientific naturalism and faith 
in a wise creator. 
 
Insofar as Herder’s God is an interpretation of Spinoza, it is riddled with problems. 
But God is much more than this, for – however unconvincingly – it sets out to use 
Spinozism to solve problems that Kantianism had, as yet, been unable to solve.20 Not 
only does Herder argue that Spinoza provides a way of reconciling science and faith; 
he argues that Spinoza makes mechanistic accounts of nature compatible with 
teleological ones. Furthermore, he suggests that by keeping all being – nature, God 
and human minds – strictly within the realm of organic force and possible knowledge, 
his de-metaphysicized Spinozism is more Kantian than Kant himself. It strives to 
overcome the problems of the first Antinomy without recourse to noumena, by 
arguing that the first, intentional cause is immanent to nature; it addresses the problem 
of accounting for natural difference simply by endowing organic force with divine 
purposiveness. Implausible though it is, Herder’s God seemed to imply that if 
Kantians adopted its dynamic pantheism, they could combine naturalism with a well-
grounded belief in God, avoid positing a noumenal realm, and ground morality in the 
wise organization of the perfect universe. 
 
2. Kant’s critique of Herder’s Spinozism 
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Kant had been antagonistic to Herder for some time, but the publication of God must 
have been particularly galling. Here was Herder sweeping through problems that had 
occupied Kant for years, the problem of reconciling mechanism with teleology 
foremost among them. In 1789 Jacobi sent Kant a copy of the second edition of his 
own Doctrine of Spinoza, which now included two supplements criticizing Herder’s 
God. Specifically, Jacobi argued that God could not be both intelligent and 
impersonal, as Herder claimed. If Spinoza’s God was an impersonal force, it must 
also be a power of blind necessity, with which teleology could not be reconciled.21 
Jacobi’s supplement on Herder was well timed for Kant, who was finishing the 
Critique of Judgment. Jacobi denies ‘that there can be an in-between system […] 
between the system of final causes and the system of purely efficient ones’, but 
suggests that a teleological system could include mechanistic causation, as long as 
God had intellect and will as his highest powers.22 Kant, in the midst of developing a 
similar position, wrote to Jacobi on August 30 of that year to thank him for his 
‘handsome book on Spinoza’s theory.’ 
 
You have earned distinction, first of all for having clearly presented 
the difficulties of the teleological road to theology, difficulties that 
seem to have led Spinoza to his system. To dash with hasty, 
enterprising steps toward a faraway goal has always been injurious 
to a thorough insight. He who shows us the cliffs has not necessarily 
set them up, and even if someone maintains that it is impossible to 
pass through them with full sails (of dogmatism), he has not on that 
account denied every possibility of getting through.23 
 
The two systems of mechanism and teleology are the ‘cliffs’ to which Kant refers. 
The difficulty of upholding both at once led Spinoza to deny teleology and an 
intentional God altogether. Herder’s attempt to pass between the cliffs with 
teleological Spinozism was doomed to fail, because he dogmatically asserted 
theoretical knowledge of God. But, with ‘the compass of reason’, Kant says, such 
passage is not impossible. He approves of Jacobi’s refutation of the ‘syncretism’ of 
Spinozism and Deism in Herder’s God, noting that syncretism is usually based on 
insincerity, a quality ‘especially characteristic of this great artist in delusions’. 
 
This was not the first time Kant had attacked Herder for his ‘artistic’ method. Four 
years earlier, Kant had been invited to review Part One of Herder’s Ideas in the 
Allegemeine Literatur-Zeitung. He dismisses Herder as an eloquent lightweight whose 
assimilation of material from across the arts and sciences renders his work exempt 
from ordinary standards of judgment. He attacks Herder’s method which substitutes 
for logical precision, careful distinctions and consistent principles ‘a cursory and 
comprehensive vision and a ready facility for discovering analogies.’24 Herder is an 
enthusiast who ought to ‘curb his lively genius’, and the Ideas a work of poetic 
imagination with little philosophical or scientific merit. Especially troubling to Kant is 
Herder’s constant appeal to organic force, and his claim to have inferential knowledge 
of it. Explaining natural organization through organic force is ‘the author’s attempt to 
explain what is not understood in terms of what is understood even less’.25 Even 
worse, with his claim that organic force is known only from its effects, Herder 
transcends the limits of possible experience. Despite Herder’s claim to set aside all 
metaphysics, he ends up dogmatically postulating a metaphysical entity, organic 
force, as the explanandum of the entire system.  
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Herder’s attempt to explain natural diversity through the purposiveness of organic 
force cannot work either. For, Kant says, the notion that a single organic force could 
produce every individual difference in nature is neither verifiable by science, nor 
comprehensible by reason. 
 
[That] the unity of organic force which, as an autonomous formative 
principle in relation to the diversity of all organic creatures and 
subsequently as the producer of various kinds of effect appropriate to 
the variety of these organisms, supposedly constitutes the entire 
difference between the various genera and species, is an idea which 
lies wholly outside the field of scientific observation. It belongs to 
purely speculative philosophy; but even in the latter, if it were once to 
gain admission, it would cause much havoc among previously 
accepted concepts.26 
 
Kant praises Herder for addressing the problem of natural diversity, but adds that 
failure is to be expected in this endeavour. ‘The mysterious obscurity in which nature 
itself has concealed its organic functions […] bears some responsibility for the 
obscurity and uncertainty’ of Herder’s book.27 Nature is probably too heterogeneous 
for its genesis as a whole to be explained in naturalistic terms, he says; an obscure, 
dogmatically asserted concept of organic force certainly wasn’t going to solve the 
problem.  
 
In 1787, then, Kant and Herder were working on the same problem: how could 
mechanism be reconciled with teleology, in order to account for the possibility of 
organic nature? Herder had offered his concept of purposive organic force, now 
redeveloped through Spinozism and repackaged as Divine Power. Kant, however, 
believed that the purposiveness of nature had to be a feature of judgment, the core 
conviction of the third Critique. It is in the Critique of Judgment, therefore, that 
Kant’s critique of Herder achieves full expression.28 Sections 72 and 73 of the 
Critique of Teleological Judgment are dedicated to demonstrating that neither 
Herder’s hylozoism, nor Spinozism proper, can explain the purposiveness manifested 
by organisms (or ‘natural purposes’, as Kant calls them). Section 85, ‘On 
Physciotheology’, denies that Herder’s Spinozism can be a basis for faith or morality. 
But why was it so important to Kant that mechanism and teleology be reconciled in 
exactly the right way, such that Herder’s God had not only to be rejected, but utterly 
repudiated? 
 
First, Herder poses the problem of mechanism and teleology in the wrong way. The 
question is not whether nature itself is mechanistic, teleological, or both; it is how we 
are to judge an organized being in terms of two seemingly conflicting principles. This 
is how Kant introduces the Antinomy of Judgment.29 The thesis and antithesis of the 
antinomy represent the understanding’s demand that all natural beings be judged 
possible in terms of mechanical laws, and reason’s requirement of the law of final 
causes in our judgment of certain products of nature. The antinomy is one of 
judgment, between two regulative principles for the investigation of nature. Kant 
shows that if these were converted to constitutive principles concerning the 
productive ground of nature, we would end up with an antinomy of reason. That is the 
kind of antinomy found in the first Critique; were it to be posed, and resolved, along 
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the lines of the first Critique, we would arrive at a regulative idea of reason for 
considering the productive basis of nature in general. But the problem in the Critique 
of Judgment is how to judge a specific object, an organism, in terms of two conflicting 
principles: mechanism and teleology. If we employ both principles, then we judge the 
same object both as fully necessitated through mechanical laws and as contingent in 
respect of those laws. Judgment cannot be guided by both principles simultaneously 
concerning the same object unless the principles are reconciled.30 The antinomy does 
not concern whether or not there is a non-mechanical productive cause in nature, but 
whether judgment is to be guided by the law of mechanistic necessity or the principle 
of purposive contingency. Herder’s concept of Divine Power is a red herring, for even 
if Herder is right that the world is produced by Divine Power, we cannot know that it 
is, and the antinomy of judgment remains.  
 
It is around this antinomy that Kant’s worry about Spinozism emerges. For if Kant 
cannot reconcile the two principles, there remains a loophole through which a Kantian 
account of nature can be combined with Spinozism. Kant had argued, in the first 
Critique, that all things must be judged to be governed by the mechanical laws 
constitutive of phenomenal nature. But, as McFarland puts it, Kant ‘did not prove that 
we must adopt this view of nature as the sole methodological principle in our physical 
investigations’.31 Kant has not demonstrated that mechanical laws are the only way in 
which nature can be judged, leaving the way open for certain positions that are not 
incompatible with the arguments of the Transcendental Analytic. An adherent to 
Kant’s first Critique could well believe that we must judge nature to be fully 
determined through mechanical laws down to its most specific elements, even though 
we may never discover what those infinitely specific laws are. On this view, 
contingency in nature is an illusion that indicates the limitations of our understanding 
in its specification of the laws of nature. A Kantian could embrace Spinoza’s doctrine 
that nothing in nature is contingent, and that ‘contingency’ names our incomplete 
understanding of the necessary determination of a thing. 
 
The Critique of Judgment intends, among other things, to reject this kind of 
deterministic Kantianism, for its consequences are dire. If everything in nature must 
be judged to have been necessitated through mechanistic laws, then the general laws 
of nature must be specified down to the most minute details. Laws would be so 
particularlized and heterogeneous that they would cease to be universal, threatening 
the possibility of natural science. But worse, the determinist scenario makes freedom 
impossible. There is no ‘room’ for the effects of noumenal free causality to be 
brought about in phenomenal nature. The gulf between the domain of nature and the 
domain of freedom remains unbridgeable, and the possibility of achieving our final 
purpose in nature is denied. On this account, free causality cannot be the real driver of 
reason, but is merely a useful fiction, as it is for Spinoza. And then the Kantian case 
for morality and rational faith in God falls into serious difficulty. Deterministic 
Kantiansim seems to end up in Spinozism, positing an infinite number of 
heterogeneous natural laws, denying contingency in nature, and claiming that freedom 
is imaginary.  
 
The worry, then, is that a certain kind of Kantian could simultaneously hold 
Spinozistic views about nature, and that the first Critique did nothing to dispel those 
views. Herder’s God had given a focus to young minds influenced by both Kant and 
the Spinoza-revival of the 1780s.32 The third Critique needed to show that these 
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positions were not compatible, and that one could not be both a Kantian and a 
Spinozist unless one wanted to give up natural science, morality, and rational faith 
altogether. All of these concerns come to a head in the Antinomy of Judgment. The 
resolution of the antinomy, the defence of natural contingency, and the refutation of 
Spinoza are therefore central to the Critique of Judgment, as Zammito and Allison 
stress.33 
 
The presentation of the Antinomy is followed by Kant’s discussion of four systems 
concerning the purposiveness of nature, identified according to two sets of criteria. 
First, are purposes in nature real and intentional, or ideal and unintentional? Second, 
what accounts for the purposive form manifested by organisms: physical or 
hyperphysical causes? Four dogmatic doctrines emerge: ancient materialism (idealist 
about purposes and physicalist about causes), Spinozism (idealist about purposes and 
hyperphysicalist about causes), hylozoism (realist about purposes and physicalist 
about causes), and theism (realist about purposes and hyperphysicalist about causes). 
While Kant argues that none of these systems explains purposiveness, the purpose of 
the section is primarily to refute hylozoism and Spinozism. Hylozoism posits an 
intentional cause to account for the production of natural purposes, but fails because it 
locates intentions in the life of matter.34 For Kant, the concept of a living matter is 
contradictory. Kant’s definition of life, the ability of a being to act in accordance with 
representations and desires, excludes material nature.35 While human beings have life 
by virtue of their supersensible freedom, natural purposes can only be said by analogy 
to have life, based on their seemingly purposive organization.36 ‘We cannot even 
think of living matter as possible. The very concept of it involves a contradiction, 
since the essential character of matter is lifelessness, inertia.’37 Hylozoism proper, 
then, cannot stand. As for the closely related idea that matter is endowed with life by 
organic force ‘and that nature as a whole is thus an animal’38, its adherents (i.e. 
Herder) claim that the life principle can be inferred only from empirical observation 
of the natural purposiveness that is supposed to be explained by the life principle. 
This circular explanation, which Kant had similarly criticized in his review of 
Herder’s Ideas, not only invents an illegitimate metaphysical principle; it fails to 
explain teleological judgment. 
 
As for Spinozism, Kant argues that Spinoza’s system fails to explain teleological 
judgment for three interrelated reasons.39 First, by claiming that particular things 
inhere in God, Spinoza denies that there is a causal relation between God and natural 
beings. Spinoza, on Kant’s view, confuses the internal relation of substance to 
accident with the external relation of cause to effect; the immanent relation between 
substance and its modes precludes it being also a causal relation. If natural purposes 
are mere accidents inhering in substance, they cannot be considered products, either 
of nature or of intentional design. Second, Spinoza denies that there is contingency in 
nature, and therefore deprives us of our ability to judge nature to have the ‘unity of 
purpose’ required for our concept of purposiveness. This leaves no basis on which to 
judge nature as purposive or intentionally produced. Thus, third, Spinoza’s substance 
has neither intentionality nor understanding. Substance produces natural forms 
through blind natural necessity, and thus in Spinoza’s system, all of nature must be 
judged according to necessary mechanical laws. Spinoza’s God, then, despite its 
unity, can explain neither the purposiveness of natural forms, nor our idea of 
purposiveness. Unless it meets the condition of external intentional causation, the 
unity of Spinoza’s God can be nothing more than natural necessity, and our 
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representation of its ontological unity cannot give rise to any idea of purposiveness. 
So Spinoza’s account fails, both as an explanation of purposes in nature and as an 
explanation of teleological judgment.40 
 
Kant’s assessment of Spinoza is quite unfair, not least in that he ignores Spinoza’s 
own critique of teleological judgment in the Appendix to Part I of the Ethics. If Kant 
is legitimately to compare his own account of purposiveness with Spinoza’s, he ought 
to address Spinoza’s explanation of our judgment that nature is purposive. Instead, 
Kant attacks Spinoza’s view that substance is, in itself, neither contingent nor 
intentional, and becomes a victim of his own antinomy. We will not focus on the 
shortcomings of Kant’s criticism of Spinoza here, however. What Kant finds 
objectionable in Spinoza’s God is, first, that it causes its modes immanently, not 
externally; and second, that it lacks intentions and will, thus depriving nature of 
contingency and failing to ground teleological judgment. On Kant’s view, then, 
neither Spinoza’s substance, nor Herder’s organic force, can account for natural 
purposes.  
 
The question [of natural purposes] remains absolutely unanswerable 
(for our reason) unless we treat it as follows: we must think of that 
original basis of things as a simple substance; the quality that enables 
this substance to give rise to the specific character of the natural forms 
based on it, namely, their unity of a purpose, we must think of as its 
intelligence; and the relation of this substance to those natural forms 
we must think of as a causality.41 
 
Herder is therefore wrong to think of God as being equivalent to nature, and knowable 
through scientific investigation, for that conception of God can ground neither 
teleological judgment nor faith. Kant’s critique of physicotheology in section 85 of 
the Critique of Judgment aims to show that the Spinozism of Herder’s God cannot 
ground faith. Physicotheology, defined as ‘reason’s attempt to infer the supreme cause 
of nature, and the properties of this cause, from the purposes of nature (which we can 
cognize only empirically)’, cannot provide a basis for theology, because all its 
inferences to prior causes remain immanent to nature.42 A concept of a supreme 
intelligent cause of the world, if it is to be determinate and thereby theoretically or 
practically useful, depends on the determinate idea of a final purpose of nature. But 
physicotheology cannot even inquire into that idea, since the basis for the existence of 
nature must be sought outside nature.43 Herderian Spinozism might be useful for 
scientific speculations, and it induces us to look for a theology, ‘but it cannot produce 
one’.44 
 
In case his readers hadn’t yet been persuaded away from Spinozism, Kant adds an 
unsubtle warning about the life of the Spinozist. Someone who wants to be good but 
does not believe in God or providence – ‘Spinoza, for example’ – will be unable to 
achieve his moral purposes.45 His failure will be directly related to his inability to see 
the harmony between those purposes and the laws of nature. As a result, his moral 
aims will be meaningless, his life purposeless, his experiences governed by despair at 
the disorder of the world. Worse, he will see himself and his fellow humans reduced 
to their materiality, subjected to  
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all the evils of deprivation, disease, and untimely death, just like all the 
other animals on the earth. And they will stay subjected to these evils 
always, until one vast tomb engulfs them one and all (honest or not, 
that makes no difference here) and hurls them, who managed to 
believe they were the final purpose of creation, back into the abyss of 
the purposeless chaos of matter from which they were taken.46 
 
Kant’s apocalyptic vision of the meaningless life and painful death of the Spinozist is 
a stark warning not to reject faith in the transcendent God for the fanaticism of 
immanent force.  
 
3. Kant and Spinozism in the Opus Postumum 
 
We return, then, to the Opus Postumum, and the question of Kant’s mysterious 
references to Spinoza. The Opus Postumum arguably contains a great deal of 
Spinozistic thinking. As I indicated earlier, Kant’s ether proofs attempt to demonstrate 
that all possible experience is a continuum of forces that is both material and 
transcendental. Everything that can appear in space and time has its complete 
explanatory ground in the ether: Kant sometimes calls it ‘space as an object of 
sense’.47 The closest approximation to this idea in Spinoza is what he calls ‘the face of 
the whole universe’48, the infinite expression of God in the attribute of extension, 
which can be understood as the infinite dynamical continuum of physical being. 
Herder’s universe is really a variant of this ‘face’. Kant’s ether resembles this concept 
too: it is a single dynamical reality responsible for the existence and determination of 
physical beings. It is not a transitive, external cause of its effects, but rather, as an 
oscillating field of force which expresses individual bodies, it is those bodies, which it 
produces immanently. Indeed, Kant occasionally refers to the ether in Spinozistic 
terms: he remarks that the ether ‘contains the One and All of outer sense-objects’, for 
instance, employing a key phrase of the German neo-Spinozists.49  
 
Given Kant’s apparent conversion to a Spinozistic concept of nature, we might 
assume that his remarks on Spinoza reveal an affinity that he had only recently 
noticed, or could only lately admit. Edwards, for instance, argues that Kant casts 
Spinoza in a positive light in the Opus Postumum,50 a more attractive and plausible 
reading than Allison’s limited view that Kant intends nothing towards Spinoza 
beyond his usual accusation of Schwärmerei, fanaticism.51 However, I think both are 
mistaken to believe Kant is referring to Spinoza at all in the Opus Postumum. Kant’s 
remarks on Spinoza refer to Herder, and the influence Herder’s Spinozism 
increasingly had on young transcendental idealists such as Schelling. This is also the 
view taken by Guyer, who argues that Kant names Spinoza to emphasize the 
difference between his own theory and the Spinozism of Schelling and his 
followers.52 
 
To see why this is so, let’s turn to Kant’s remarks on Spinoza. They occur exclusively 
in the latest sections of the Opus Postumum, those written in 1800-01.53 There are two 
focuses of Kant’s interest: Spinoza’s notion that ‘we intuit ourselves in God’, and, 
more puzzlingly, ‘Spinoza’s transcendental idealism’. These ideas are linked together, 
as if Spinoza’s transcendental idealism is supposed to consist in his belief that we 
intuit ourselves, and all things, in God. So, for instance, we have the enigmatic 
comment: ‘According to Spinoza’s transcendental idealism, we intuit ourselves in 
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God’54 and, several pages later, ‘Spinoza’s idea of the highest being – of intuiting all 
supersensible beings in God. Moral-practical reason. Transcendental idealism’.55  
 
Various explanations have been tentatively put forward for these remarks, from the 
view that Kant mistakenly wrote ‘transcendental idealism’ when he meant to castigate 
Spinoza’s dogmatic idealism,56 to the claim that Kant actively sought to integrate 
Spinozism into a new variant of transcendental idealism.57 What seems clear is that 
Kant has latched on to an idea which, rightly or wrongly, he associates with both 
Spinoza and transcendental idealism. That idea is that we intuit the supersensible 
aspects of ourselves – our moral-practical reason – as being in God, a fact that enables 
us to connect our being in the world with our moral aims and faith. This is an old idea 
adapted to the new language of the Opus Postumum. Whereas the three Critiques 
taught us that humans are objects of both theoretical and practical knowledge – 
appearances with roots in the supersensible – the Opus Postumum tells us that we are 
beings of ether and beings of God. As material bodies, we are part of nature, and as 
moral persons, we are part of the supersensible realm of God. Perhaps Kant thinks 
that Spinoza understood this essential point, but made the mistake of claiming that 
nature and God are one. 
 
Indeed, the necessary distinctness of God and the world is a strong theme in this 
section. Man is the being who connects the two, by virtue of his personality, his 
ability to know and posit his existence as a moral being with free will.  
 
Man, as animal, belongs to the world, but, as person, also to the 
beings who are capable of rights – and, consequently, have freedom 
of the will. […] God, the world, and I: the thinking being in the 
world who connects them.  
God and the world are the two objects of transcendental philosophy; 
thinking man is the subject, predicate and copula. The subject who 
combines them in one proposition. These are logical relations in a 
proposition, not dealing with the existence of objects, but merely 
bringing what is formal in their relations of these objects to synthetic 
unity. God, the world, and I, man, a world-being myself, who 
combines the two.58 
 
There are many passages like this one in the final sections of the Opus Postumum. 
Many others insist that God is the world’s author, not its inhabitant, and is definitely 
not a world-soul.59 As ever, Kant does not claim the necessary existence of God or 
freedom, but rather the necessity of assuming them for the unity of transcendental 
philosophy. God is a rational ideal that man brings to the world in order to explain it 
and to understand it as a suitable arena for moral action. 
 
There is another angle to Kant’s remarks on Spinoza. Kant believes that Spinoza 
understands space to be in God, and thus any outer experience amounts to intuiting 
things in God.60 Kant seems to indicate that, since God functions as a kind of formal 
condition of possible experience for Spinoza, Spinoza is more of a transcendental 
idealist than those naturalists for whom ‘what matters is only the lawlike connection 
of appearances’.61 Perhaps this explains Kant’s remark that ‘the spirit of man is 
Spinoza’s God (so far as the formal element of all sense-objects is concerned) and 
transcendental idealism is realism in an absolute sense’.62 That is, for Spinoza, space 
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is in God, and so God, existing as the spirit of each man, provides the formal element 
of sense-objects. But a variant of transcendental idealism that gives God this role 
would be transcendental idealism ‘in an absolute sense’: it would substitute for 
subjective formal conditions absolute formal conditions. That kind of transcendental 
idealism would be realism. So, a transcendental idealist who maintains that space (or 
nature, or ether, or organic force) is ‘in God’, is really a metaphysical realist. 
‘Spinoza’s transcendental idealism, taken literally, is transcendent’.63 A Kantian 
transcendental idealist does not hold ‘that we intuit in the deity, as Spinoza imagines’, 
but rather that human beings bring the idea of God into nature.64 
 
The purpose of Kant’s Spinoza references is therefore his ongoing critique of 
Herderian Spinozism. It is particularly important that Kant revives this critique, since 
the problem that had led Kant to refute Herderian Spinozism in the Critique of 
Judgment had raised itself again: it appeared to be possible to hold elements of 
transcendental idealism and Spinozism simultaneously. Kant may have thought he 
had refuted Spinozism in his earlier text, but clearly not convincingly enough for 
young thinkers to abandon dynamic pantheism. By 1800, Kant had seen the rise of 
‘refined Spinozism’ and its development through Naturphilosophie in the first texts of 
Schelling. Kant connects Schelling to Spinozism65, and cites a review of his System of 
Transcendental Idealism66, in which Schelling is named as Kant’s greatest 
representative, extending Kantian idealism in exciting new directions. In these pages 
Kant frequently names G. C. Lichtenberg, who was positive about both Kantian 
idealism and ‘refined Spinozism’.67 In other words, the latest sections of the Opus 
Postumum indicate not a new interest in Spinoza, but the resurgence of Kant’s 
concern over those who wanted to fuse transcendental idealism with Spinozism. 
 
Moreover, Kant had just attempted to demonstrate the necessary existence of ether, 
which bears a striking resemblance to similar ideas in Spinoza, Herder, and Schelling. 
If the ether proofs were to be published as part of Kant’s ‘Transition from the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics’ (and it seems that Kant did 
have some of this section copied out in preparation for publication), he would need to 
distinguish his account of ether sharply from those other accounts of unified 
dynamical nature. He does this through his insistence that ether is not as unified as 
those other accounts. It explains material nature only, and cannot explain natural 
purposes. The unity of purpose that Kant found lacking in Spinoza’s substance is 
equally lacking in his own dynamical ether, meaning that ether cannot explain 
purposiveness in nature. Nor does Kant intend it to: the admission that ether produces 
purposively would be to capitulate to hylozoism. Organic nature requires ‘an 
immaterial principle, possessing an indivisible unity in its power of representation’.68 
God cannot be grounded in ether, for God is not continuous with nature or a world-
soul inhering in it. Kant’s ether is strictly distinct from God, purposes, and freedom, 
and it is that point that Kant needs to stress in order to distinguish his view from 
Herderian – or, now, Schellingian – Spinozism. 
 
This is the context for Kant’s Spinoza comments, and, while they are undoubtedly 
cryptic, their purpose seems to be again to make Spinozism the foil to Kant’s own 
view that God must be thought as the external, intelligent, and purposive creator of 
the world. If we fail to think God in that way, and if we fail to understand ourselves as 
the ‘hinge’ between God and the world, then we resign ourselves to a world 
constituted and explained exclusively by forces, a world in which morality and faith 
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are impossible. In 1800, Kant needs to show that science and faith are compatible 
without being collapsed together, and that if purposes are to be part of our judgments 
of nature, God and the world must be understood as transcendent, intentional cause 
and separate effect. Kant continues to believe that science and faith, mechanism and 
teleology, can be reconciled only if Spinozism is put to rest.  
 
Whether one accepts this interpretation depends, to a large extent, on whether one 
sees the Opus Postumum as a whole as continuing, or disrupting, Kant’s earlier 
conception of transcendental idealism – the primary question governing studies of this 
peculiar text. If the Opus Postumum marks a continuation of the ideas of the three 
Critiques, then I think we must conclude, as Guyer does, that Kant names Spinoza in 
order to reject him. If the Opus Postumum is taken to disrupt the critical system and 
push it in a new direction, then perhaps Kant uses Spinoza to signal his approval of 
Schelling, as Edwards argues, or his readiness to move beyond the anti-hylozoism of 
the third Critique, as Toscano suggests. I am remaining agnostic on this question for 
now. The rejection of Herder’s Spinozism seems to me the right context in which to 
address Kant’s late remarks on Spinoza. We can then turn to the much more 
interesting question of whether Kant reiterates that rejection, or recants it.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, ed. Eckart Förster, trans. Förster and Michael Rosen (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1993). References will state the pagination in both the Akademie edition and the English 
translation. The Opus Postumum contains texts written between roughly 1796 and 1803, some of them 
notes and fragments, others coherent drafts towards what Kant apparently intended to be a ‘Transition 
from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics’. For information on the dating of 
texts in the OP, see Förster’s introduction. 
2 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:229, p.76. 
3 See Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. James Ellington, in 
Immanuel Kant, Philosophy of Material Nature, ed. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985). 
4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), 
B145.  
5 I have written on Kant’s ether in Beth Lord, ‘The Virtual and the Ether: Transcendental Empiricism 
in Kant’s Opus Postumum’, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 39:2 (2008). For other 
positions see Eckart Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000); Jeffrey 
Edwards, Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000); Paul Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 2005); Michael 
Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992); and Alberto Toscano, 
The Theatre of Production (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). 
6 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 22:547, p.85. 
7 For more on the pantheism controversy and the intellectual climate in Germany in the 1780s, see 
Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), and John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). I have drawn on these books extensively in this paper. 
8 Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind, in J.G. Herder on Social 
and Political Culture, trans. and ed. F. M. Barnard (Cambridge: CUP, 1969). References are to this 
edition. 
9 Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind, p.283. 
10 Johann Gottfried Herder, God: Some Conversations, trans. Frederick H. Burkhardt (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1940). References are to this edition. 
11 Johann Gottfried Herder, God: Some Conversations, pp.100-5. 
12 See David Bell, Spinoza in Germany from 1670 to the Age of Goethe (London: University of London 
Institute of Germanic Studies, 1984), pp.118-26. 
13 Johann Gottfried Herder, God: Some Conversations, p.97. 
14 Johann Gottfried Herder, God: Some Conversations, p.97. 
15 Johann Gottfried Herder, God: Some Conversations, p.103. 
 15
                                                                                                                                            
16 Johann Gottfried Herder, God: Some Conversations, p.104. 
17 See, Johann Gottfried Herder, God: Some Conversations, p.71, p.98, and p.113. Spinoza refers to St. 
Paul’s phrase (Acts 17:28) as an illustration of his own doctrine of immanence in Letter 73: Benedict 
de Spinoza, Complete Works, ed. Michael L. Morgan, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2002), p.942. See also Kant’s reference to this remark in: Opus Postumum 22:55, p.214. 
18 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Appendix, Complete Works, pp.238-43. 
19 Johann Gottfried Herder, God: Some Conversations, pp.122-24. 
20 For further discussion, see John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, pp.178-
247 and Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, pp.127-64. 
21 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 
Mendelssohn, in: The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, trans. George di Giovanni 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), p.367. 
22 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 
Mendelssohn, p.366. 
23 Kant to Jacobi, 30 Aug. 1789, in: Immanuel Kant, Correspondence, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1999), Ak. 11:75-6. 
24 Kant’s reviews of Parts I and II of Herder’s Ideas were published anonymously in the Allgemeine 
Literaturzeitung of January 1785 and November 1785. They are now at Ak. 8:43-66, and translated as 
‘Reviews of Herder’s Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind’ in Immanuel Kant, Political 
Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), pp.201-20. References are to this edition. 
25 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, p.209. 
26 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, p.210. 
27 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, p.210. 
28 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). 
References to this are followed by the Akademie pagination. 
29 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:386-9. 
30 See: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:411-12, and Pluhar’s introduction: Critique of 
Judgment, pp.lxxxviii-xci. 
31 J. D. McFarland, Kant’s Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970), 
p.120. See also John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, pp.214-227. 
32 John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, pp.202-3, pp.246-7. 
33 See: John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p.248, and Henry Allison, 
‘Kant’s Critique of Spinoza’, in Spinoza: Critical Assessments, vol. IV, ed. Genevieve Lloyd (London: 
Routledge, 2001), pp.188-212. 
34 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:392. 
35 This definition of life can be found in the Critique of Practial Reason (Ak. 5:9n); Metaphysics of 
Morals (Ak. 6:211); Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Ak. 4:544); and several places in 
the metaphysics lectures. See John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, pp.189-
92; Paul Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom, pp.96-8; and Alberto Toscano, The Theatre of 
Production, pp.19-84. 
36 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:374-5. 
37 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:394. 
38 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:394. 
39 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:393. For different interpretations of this material, see Henry 
Allison, ‘Kant’s Critique of Spinoza’, pp.195-202; and John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment, pp.251-9. 
40 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:394. 
41 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:421. 
42 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:436. 
43 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:437. 
44 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:440. 
45 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:452. 
46 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, 5:452. 
47 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:219, p.69. 
48 Benedict de Spinoza, ‘Letter 64’, Complete Works, p.919. 
49 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:586 and n, p.93. 
50 Jeffrey Edwards, Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge, p.186. 
51 Henry Allison, ‘Kant’s Critique of Spinoza’, p.207. 
52 Paul Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom, pp.278-9. 
 16
                                                                                                                                            
53 The suggestion that these writings are a product of Kant’s senility is no longer credible. Förster has 
established that all but a few sheets of the OP were written by 1801, the year in which Kant’s health 
started to decline (Opus Postumum, p.xxviii). 
54 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 22:56, p.214. 
55 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:12, p.220. 
56 Henry Allison, ‘Kant’s Critique of Spinoza’, p.207. 
57 Jeffrey Edwards, Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge, p.186. On Spinozism in the 
Opus Postumum, see: Paul Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom, pp.277-313, Jeffrey 
Edwards, Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge, pp.182-92, and Jeffrey Edwards, 
‘Spinozism, Freedom, and Transcendental Dynamics in Kant’s Final System of Transcendental 
Idealism’ in Sally Sedgwick (ed.), The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 
2000). 
58 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:36-7, pp.238-9. 
59 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:31, p.234. 
60 See: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: CUP, 
1997), Ak. 5:101-2. 
61 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:87-8, p.251. 
62 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:99, p.255. 
63 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:22, p.228. 
64 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 22:59, p.216. 
65 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:87, p.251. 
66 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 21:97, p.254. 
67 On Schelling and Lichtenberg, see Förster’s notes at Opus Postumum, pp.274-5 and pp.279-80. 
68 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, 22:547, p.85. 
 
 
Beth Lord is... 
